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THE ADVANCE FEE PAYMENT DILEMMA:
SHOULD PAYMENTS BE DEPOSITED TO
THE CLIENT TRUST ACCOUNT OR TO
THE GENERAL OFFICE ACCOUNT?
Lester Brickman *

A lawyer possessing client property is acting in a fiduciary capac
ity.' If the property is in the form of funds, fiduciary safeguards man
date the deposit of the funds to a client trust account—a requirement
that has occasioned a considerable volume of disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers.^ Disciplinary Rule 9-102 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("DR 9-102"), entitled "Preserving Identity of Funds
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to his research assistants, Irving Cohen and Nancy Sindell,
who have made important contributions to this article.
,^
1 See /« « Caplan, 59 A.D.2d 42, 397 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1977); In re Iverson, 51 A.D.2d 422,
381 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1976).
2 A client trust account is a separately maintained bank account that
must be identified as a client or trust account and cannot be the account tnaintained for a lawyer's law firm or other business purposes
Funds of all clients
can generaUy be deposited in the same trust account, in which case adequate
records must be maintained of each client's interest in the account.
C. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 4.8, at 179-80 (1986).
3 [Tjhere were more than 800 disbarments and suspensions nationally between the
years 1980 and 1985 as a result of violations of attorney tmst accounts. The
wrongs include misappropriation of client funds, poor or inadequate record keep
ing, embezzlement or theft of client funds, conversion of client property, commin
gling, and poor accounting of client funds.
Weston, Speaking of Ethics, Killing an Ant with a Sledgehammer, 4 Compleat Law. 49, 49
(1987) (citing the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility National
Discipline Data Bank). See Austem, Ethics, 20 Trial 16, 16 (1984) (trust accounts present
potentially serious disciplinary problems for lawyers); Kurzer, Coleman, Leiter & Trager, At
torneys' Trust Accounts-Rules and Pitfalls, 55 Fla. B.J. 355, 356 (1981) [hereinafter Kurzer]
("A large number of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers—including disbarment in some
cases—stem from the mishandling of client funds.").
4 Disciplinary Rule 9-102 states in pertinent part that:
(A) All funds of chents paid to a lawyer . . . , other than advances for costs and
expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts ... and no
funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as
follows;
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentidly to
the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to
the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the
lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the
disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
(B) A lawyer shall:
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and Property of a Client," codifies several fiduciary standards: it re
quires an attorney to deposit client funds in a trust account, to avoid
commingling client funds with the attorney's funds, and to account to
the client for the funds.' Commingling, which is regarded as a serious
offense,^ occurs when an attorney intermingles his client's funds with
his own, depriving the funds of their separate identity and facilitating
their subjection to the attorney's personal use and to the claims of the
attorney's creditors.' Funds in which both the client and the attorney
have a proprietary interest, such as proceeds from a contingent fee
settlement or award, must also be placed in the client account until
the interests are severed.®
The requirements codified by DR 9-102 are imposed only if the
funds belong at least in part to the client; thus, when an attorney first
receives funds, a determination as to their nature and ownership must
be made.' If the funds are solely the attorney's property, they must be
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other
properties.
(2) Identify and labelsecurities and properties of a client promptly ....
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of
a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate ac
counts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds,
securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client
is entitled to receive.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 9-102 (1980) [hereinafter Model
Code]. Model Rule 1.15, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules], corresponds to DR 9-102. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
' Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A). See Cutler v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 241, 455
P.2d 108, 78 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969); In re Stem, 92 N.J. 611, 458 A.2d 1279 (1983); In re
Anschell, 53 A.D.2d 297, 385 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1976); Weston, supra note 3, at 49.
6 See Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1976); In re
Castello, 402 N.E.2d 970 (Ind. 1980); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stinson, 368 So. 2d 971
(La. 1979); In re Witherington, 88 N.J. 241, 440 A.2d 1327 (1982); Columbus Bar Ass'n v.
Tuttle, 41 Ohio St. 2d, 324 N.E.2d 753 (1975); In re Rollins, 281 S.C. 467, 316 S.E.2d 670
(1984); In re Cary, 90 Wash. 2d. 762, 585 P.2d 1161 (1978).
7 Black V. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 368 P.2d 118, 122, 18 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522
(1962); see Florida Bar v. Boms, 428 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1983).
8 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2). Funds in which both the attomey and
client have an interest are typically funds received by the attomey from which his fee will be
paid. Examples of such funds are; judgment awards, e.g.. In re Rogers, 99 Ariz. 343, 409 P.2d
45 (1965); settlement proceeds, e.g.. People v. Davis, 620 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1980); In re Hartman, 61 A.D.2d 194, 401 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1978); proceeds of a sale of a client's real or personal
property, e.g., Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Burger, 401 P.2d 524 (Okla. 1965); State ex rel
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Dugger, 385 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1963); and estate proceeds, e.g., Attomey
Grievance Comm'n v. Boehm, 293 Md. 476, 446 A.2d 52 (1982); In re Michaelson, 298
N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1980); In re Thomas, 294 Or. 505, 659 P.2d 960 (1983).
9 State Bar of Tex., Op. 391 (1978), reprinted in 41 Tex. B.J. 322 (1978).
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deposited to his general office account;'" but if they are the chent's
property, in whole or in part, they must be deposited to the client
trust account."
How attorney fees fit into this dichotomy depends on their char
acterization. When an attorney is employed to actually or potentially
perform legal services, he has entered into a "retainer agreement.""
Funds paid to the attorney at the outset, under the retainer agree
ment, are also denominated as a "retainer." If the services being
purchased are the attorney's availability to render a service if and as
needed in a specified time frame, then the retainer is a "general re
tainer;"" if the funds are for a specific service, then the employment
relation as well as the fee is a "special retainer."" If the attorney
contracts to receive his special retainer payment in advance of per
forming the services, then that payment may be denominated as an
"advance fee payment."" Advance fee payments present a difficult
issue" since if they are not "funds of chents" within the meaning of
DR 9-102, then depositing the funds in the client trust account vio
lates DR 9-102(A), which mandates that funds belonging to the attor
ney must not be deposited in the trustee account or otherwise
1° A general office account contains those funds which are used either to pay expenses for
operating the attorney's office or for the attorney's personal expenses.
" Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102.
12 See 1 S. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees § 1:1, at 3-4 (1973).
12 A general retainer is a fee for agreeing to make legal services available when needed
during a specified time period. In form, it is an option contract; the fee is earned by the
attorney when paid since the attorney is entitled to the money regardless of whether he actu
ally performs any services for the client. Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Gal. 3d 153, 164 n.4, 593
P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 Gal. Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979); see Blair v. Columbian Fireproofing Co.,
191 Mass. 333, 77 N.E. 762 (1906).
1^ See Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279, 283, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983-84 (N.Y. Civ.
Q. 1982), aff'd, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. App. Term 1983), aff'd, 107
A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711, aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 489 N.E.2d 1283
(1985); 1 S. Speiser, supra note 12, § 1.4, at 7, § 1.8, at 11; 1 E. Thornton, A Treatise on
Attorneys at Law § 133, at 228-30 (1914); G. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 505-06 & n.65; McGlain, The Strange Concept of the Legal Retaining Fee, 8 J. Legal Prof. 123 (1983).
•2 An advance fee payment is a payment made by a client to the attorney prior to the
performance of contemplated services. The attorney depletes the prepayment as he renders
services. If the matter is completed or the attorney's work on the case otherwise ends, the
attorney is obligated to refund the balance of the advance payment to the client. D.G. Bar, Op.
113, at 1 (1982); Wash. State Bar Ass'n Code of Professional Responsibility Comm., Formal
Op. 173, reprinted in Wash. State Bar News 50 (Oct. 1980); Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2110(AX3); Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.5 comment ("A lawyer may require advance
payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion."). The advance fee payment
must be distinguished from the general retainer. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying
text.
16 See Dimitriou, Should Prepaid Fees Be Put in a Trust Account?, 3 Calif. Law. 20, 21
(1983) (Attorneys "cannot 'play it safe' by merely depositing prepaid fees in a client trust
account.").
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commingled with client funds except as provided by the rule.'' Simi
larly, if the attorney deposits the prepaid fees in his office account,
and advance fees are "funds of clients," the attorney can be disci
plined for failing to account properly to the client for the money,'® as
well as for commingling.
Seventeen state and city bar associations and several courts (en
compassing a substantial portion of the lawyers in the United States)
have issued opinions on the subject." By an almost 2:1 margin, the
opinions provide that advance fee payments must be deposited to the
trust account.^" The most thorough exposition in the bar literature
(and also the most recent) is the opinion of the New York State Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics ("N.Y. 570"), which
concludes that lawyers should deposit advance fee payments in their
general office accounts rather than in client trust accounts, even when
such payments are refundable to the extent not earned.^' This Article
I'' See supra note 4. Consequently, an attorney cannot even prevent overdrawing of the
trust account by keeping his funds in that account because he will be guilty of commingling.
Kurzer, supra note 3, at 355 n.l; see also C. Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 177 n.l (discuss
ing when commingling occurs).
Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B).
See infra notes 47-48.
20 Characterizing the opinions is complicated by confusion as to the nature of the retainer
being considered. All jurisdictions agree that a general retainer is earned when paid by the
client and therefore that sum must be deposited to the lawyer's general account. A special
retainer, paid in advance and denominated by the lawyer as nonrefundable, may be regarded as
the functional equivalent of a general retainer. Arguably, however, nonrefundable special re
tainers are illegal and unethical. See, e.g.. Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of
Greater Cleveland, Op. 84-1 (1984), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
801:6952 (June 25, 1986); Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Bar Ass'n of Nassau County,
Op. 85-5 (1985), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra, 801:6208 (May 28, 1986); Brickman & Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and
Contract Law, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 149 (1988). But the issue is far from settled and a number
of opinions countenance them. See, e.g.. 111. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 722 (1981), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra, 801:3007 (Dec. 24, 1984); Md.
State Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-21 (undated), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra, 801:4301
(July 23, 1986); Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 509 (1986).
Opinions are categorized as majority if they hold either (1) that nonrefundable retainers
are ethically valid and are therefore to be deposited to the general account since they are not
"funds of clients," and also that advance fees not denominated as nonrefundable are to be
deposited to a trust account; or (2) that nonrefundable retainers are unethical and all advance
fee payments are to be deposited to a trust account. Opinions are categorized as minority
regardless of their position on nonrefundable retainers if they hold that a refundable advance
fee does not have to be deposited to a trust account.
21 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 570 (1985) [hereinafter N.Y.
570]. However, the committee also concluded "that DR 9-102(A) does not prohibit lawyers
from agreeing with their clients to treat fee advances as client funds and depositing them in a
client trust account." Id. at 6. The author was a member of the Committee during the time it
deliberated on and adopted N.Y. 570.
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critiques N.Y. 570 as a surrogate for the minority view," contending
that it is wrong as a matter of ethics, fiduciary law, and policy. In
deed, no conclusion in N.Y. 570 or any of the minority opinions is
found acceptable or defensible.
Section I of this Article examines the history of the prohibition
against commingling. Section II discusses the modem-day rationale
for DR 9-102. Section III assesses the minority view by critiquing
N.Y. 570's analysis on textual, legal, and policy grounds; considers
the federal tax consequences of the issue; and points out a serious
omission in N.Y. 570 which renders it inconsistent with fiduciary law.
Section IV compares the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's
counterpart to DR 9-102.

I. DR 9-102's ROOTS
The obligation to segregate client funds arises from the principle
that the attorney-client relationship is one of principal and agent.^^
As an agent, the attorney sustains any loss due to commingling of the
client's property with the attorney's own property," or caused by fail
ure to preserve the property's tmst character.^' In the mid-nineteenth
century David Hoffman, a leading American lecturer on law, pub
lished his lectures,^® including his highly influential Fifty Resolutions
22 The majority of bar opinions on this issue are devoid of any reasoning, merely stating
results. N.Y. 570 was chosen to critique because it was the most recent opinion to give the
matter significant thought and analysis. An earlier opinion by the D.C. Bar, supra note 15,
also provides analysis, and the arguments advanced therein which are not replicated in N.Y.
570 are also critiqued as are arguments set forth in other bar opinions.
23 See E. Weeks, A Treatise on Attorneys and Counselors at Law § 127, at 267-68 (2d ed.
1982); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, supra note 20, 45:102 (July 24, 1985).
24 See F. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Agency § 1280, at 931 (2d ed. 1982).
25 Naltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500, 8 N.E. 289 (1886). In this case, two attorneys deposite^
client funds in a separate bank account under their firm's name and not under their client s
name. No other funds were deposited to that account. The bank failed and the client sought
recovery from the attorney. The general rule was that a third party was not Uable for a loss of
funds if the money was deposited to a separate account and its trust character preserved. Id. at
503, 8 N.E. at 290. The court, in granting recovery to the client, held that the mere creation of
a separate account for a client did not preserve the trust character of the funds. Because the
attorneys, as trustees, could have claimed legal title to the funds (because it WM deposited in
their names), the bank was required to pay the funds only to the attorneys. This would create
a debtor/creditor relationship between the attorneys and the client which, in turn, would give
the client a claim against the attorneys for the funds. The court concluded that for an attorney
to avoid liability, he must deposit the money in a manner indicating that it is the client's
money. Id. at 503-04, 8 N.E. at 291.
26 David Hoffman authored two major legal works: Legal Outlines (R.H. Helmholz & D.
Bernard, Jr. eds. 1981) (1836) and A Course of Legal Study, Addressed to Students and the
Profession Generally (1972) (1836). Mr. Hoffman " 'has contributed to elevate [the profes
sion's] standard of learning and morals, to encourage the young aspirant for its honourable
rewards, and, as a consequence, to extend its just influence in the community.' " D. Hoffman,
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regarding professional conduct.^"' One Resolution reflected and repli
cated the agency principle: "I will on no occasion blend with my own
my client's money. If kept distinctly as his, it will be less liable to be
considered as my own."^^ Hoffman's Resolutions eventually formed
the basis of the first formal code of ethics, adopted by the Alabama
Bar Association in 1887,^' which, in turn, served as a model for the
predecessor of the Code, the Canons of Ethics, adopted by the Ameri
can Bar Association in 1908.^° The Hoffman admonition regarding
client money became section 37 of the Alabama Code of Ethics^^ and,
in turn, became Canon IP^ of the Canons of Ethics, which was
amended in 1933^^ and in 1937.^^ DR 9-102 now embodies the prohi
bition against commingling.

II. CONTEMPORARY POLICY
Preserving the identity of client funds originally served two purHints on the Professional Deportment of Lawyers, with Some Counsel to Law Students 63
(Philadelphia 1846) (quoting an excerpt from The American Jurist).
27 J. Ram, A Treatise on Facts as Subjects of Inquiry by a Jury 386-99 (3d ed. 1982).
28 Id. at 392 (emphasis in original).
29 Alabama Code of Ethics (1887). See J. Devine, Problems and Materials on Lawyer
Trust Accounting 9 n.2 (1984).
20 See J. Devine, supra note 29, at 9-10.
21 Section 37 provided: "Money or other trust property coming into the possession of the
attorney should be promptly reported, and never commingled with his private property or
used by him, except with the client's knowledge and consent." Alabama Code of Ethics § 37
(1887), reprinted in J. Devine, supra note 29, at 10.
22 Canon 11 provided: "Money of the client or other trust property coming into the posses
sion of the lawyer should be reported promptly, and except with the client's knowledge and
consent should not be commingled with his private property or be used by him." Canons of
Ethics (ABA 1908), reprinted in J. Devine, supra note 29, at 10-11.
22 The "consent exception" in the 1908 version of Canon 11, see supra note 32, produced
results inconsistent with the purposes of Canon 11: "Before a lawyer would deposit money, the
lawyer would obtain the consent of the client so to do, thus relieving the lawyer of personal
responsibility. Even if consent from the client was procured through less than honorable
means, it was easier to escape liability where the bank failed." J. Devine, supra note 29, at 21
n.2. Consequently, Canon 11 was redrafted. The amendment provided in part: "Money of the
client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circum
stances be commingled with his own or be used by him." Id. at 22.
2^ Canon 11, as amended in 1937, stated:
The Lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly,
and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used
by him.
Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 11 (ABA 1937).

1989]

ADVANCE FEE PAYMENTS

653

poses: to shield client funds from the attorney's creditors,^' and to
protect the attorney from liability should these funds be lost, for ex
ample, by bank failure.^® These original underpinnings for DR 9-102
have become relatively less important as more contemporary policies
have emerged: to protect the client's money from the attorney and the
attorney from temptation. As stated in State v. Statmore,^^ the prohi
bition against commingling embodied in DR 9-102 now serves the
additional purpose of:
" 'provid[ing] against the probability in some cases, the possibihty
in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling
will result in the loss of clients' money. Moral turpitude is not
necessarily involved in the commingling of a client's money with
an attorney's own money if the client's money is not endangered by
such procedure and is always available to him. However, inher
ently there is danger in such practice for frequently unforeseen cir
cumstances arise jeopardizing the safety of the chent's funds, and
as far as the chent is concerned the result is the same whether his
money is deliberately misappropriated by an attorney or is uninten
tionally lost by circumstances beyond the control of the
attorney.'
Both the historical and contemporary policies are concerned
with loss of client funds: the former with loss to the attorney's credi
tors and the latter with loss by defalcation. Attorneys who commin
gle their own funds with those of their clients may confidently assume
that the funds they are removing from the security account are their
own when, in fact, due to inadvertence or miscalculation, they may be
a client's funds. "At some point mere negligence [becomes] blatant
embezzlement."^' For example, if the attorney expects a large fee
from settlement of a major personal injury action to arrive momen
tarily but lacks the cash in his office account to pay his employees, he
may borrow from his clients' account to cover his present demands—
fully intending of course to replace the money after he receives that
large fee. Indeed, he does do so. But the situation recurs, except the
fee does not materialize due to unforeseen circumstances. The attor
ney then borrows more money from a second client to repay the first
35 See In re Clayter, 78 111. 2d 276, 281, 399 N.E.2d 1318, 1320 (1980); Trustees v. Beckmann, 143 N.J. Super. 548, 364 A.2d 15 (1976).
36 See supra note 25.
37 218 Neb. 138, 352 N.W.2d 875 (1984).
38 Statmore, 218 Neb. at 142, 352 N.W.2d at 878 (quoting In re Moore, 110 Ariz. 312, 31415, 518 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1974) (quoting Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 17 P.2d 112 (1932))).
39 Carpenter, The Negligent Attorney Embezzler: Delaware's Solution, 61 A.B.A. J. 338,
338 (1975). See Comment, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients' Funds: A Study in Profes
sional Responsibility, 10 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 415, 416 (1977).
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client and the pattern continues.'*" At both junctures he has commin
gled funds; if client demands for repayment cannot be met, then his
innocent commingling has turned into embezzlement.
By maintaining separate, clearly identifiable accounts that re
quire accurate record keeping and reporting, the temptation to use
client funds for personal use lessens,^* as does the potential for harm
to the client.'*^ Failure to follow the requirements of DR 9-102 war
rants disciplinary action even if the client suflFers no harm."*^ Because
even the appearance of impropriety undermines public confidence in
the legal profession,'*'* it is important to deter even relatively innocent
commingling'*^ by careful maintenance of client security accounts.'*®

III. CRITIQUE OF N.Y. 570 AND THE MINORITY POSITION
According to one court and the majority of state and city bar
committees that have commented on the subject, advance payments
of legal fees must be deposited to client trust accounts.'*' A minority
40 See Comment, Attorney Misappropriation of Client Funds (pt. 2), 27 How. L.J. 1597,
1604-06 (1984) (describing case of attorney who became involved in " 'a process of robbing
Peter to pay Paul that he hoped would end when he could catch up with a big negligence
settlement or an investment killing' ").
"[L]ead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil . . . ." Matthew 6:13.
'••2 See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hinrichs, 486 So. 2d 116 (La. 1986) (attorney unable to
remit settlement money to client because he used the money to pay personal debts).
Even if the client suffers no harm from the attorney's commingling, the commingling
still violates DR 9-102 and is treated accordingly, although punishment may be ameliorated.
See Florida Bar v. Whitlock, 426 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1982); In re Penegor, 104 Wis. 2d 133, 310
N.W.2d 796 (1981); see also C. Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 177 ("[I]t should normally be
irrelevant that a client suffered no direct loss because of a lawyer's personal use of a trust
account.").
44 See Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. White,
209 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1973); In re Windsor, 373 P.2d 612 (Or. 1962); Comment, supra note
40, at 1598 n.5.
45 Model Code, supra note 4, EC 9-5; see Comment, supra note 39, at 416 n.6.
46 Some states authorize annual audits of client security accounts to deter commingling.
See, e.g., Austem, supra note 3, at 16 (thirteen states require audits of client trust accounts);
Comment, supra note 40, at 1601 (discussing Delaware's spot-check investigations). See gen
erally Carpenter, supra note 39, at 339-41 (development of Delaware's policing mechanisms);
Sherman, More Random Audits: Big Brother Might be Watching, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1988, at
1, col. 3 (nationwide audit practices). A more effective device is for the annual audits to take
place without advance notice (as is the case in the securities and accounting industries). See C.
Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 182-83. Five states now impose random audits of lawyers'
security accounts. McMahon, Report to State Bar on Attorneys' Escrow Accounts, Panel
Says Random Auditing Would Not Curb Embezzlement, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 3,
at 3, col. 1. Both the First and Second Judicial Departments of the Appellate Division of the
State of New York have adopted a random audit proposal. Wise, Escrow Audits Delayed in
First Department, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 3. Disciplinary counsel in New York
have expressed support for random audits because of their deterrent effects. Fox, Mixed Reac
tions by Lawyers to Audit Escrow Accounts, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 3, at 2, col. 4.
4' See Ind. State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Subcomm., Formal Op. 4 (1977) (no analysis);
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declares that advance fee payments may or must be deposited to the
attorney's general office account, even if the funds are refundable if
unearned."*® Since N.Y. 570 is the most thorough exposition of the
minority view, it will be used as a surrogate for that view^' in the
following critique.
N.Y. 570 expounds that advance fee payments need not be con
sidered as "funds of clients" and therefore need not be deposited to a
client trust account.®" The arguments the opinion poses supporting
News Bull, of Iowa State Bar Ass'n Client Security & Attorney Disciplinary Comm'n (1988)
(no analysis); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 78-11 (1978) (no ansJysis);
Or. State Bar, Op. 454 (1980) (no analysis; advance fees are to be deposited to trust account
but not nonrefundable fees); Or. State Bar, Op. 509 (1986) (same); Bar Ass'n of San Francisco
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1980-1 (1980) (analysis refers to Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d
153, 164 n.4, 593 P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 Cal. Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979); the opinion states that
general retainers are to be deposited to the firm's general account); Ethics Advisory Comm. of
the S.C. Bar, Op. 81-15 (1982) (no analysis; general retainers are to be deposited to the general
account; special retainers to the trust account); State Bar of Tex., supra note 9 (analysis by
specific fact situations; if for services not yet rendered, must be deposited to the trust account);
Va. State Bar, Formal Op. 186-A (1981) (no analysis); Va. State Bar, Op. 681 (1985) (same);
Wash. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 15 (some analysis); State Bar of Wis., Formal Op. E-86-9
(1986) (no analysis; gener^ retainers are to be deposited to the lawyer's general account, but
advance fees are to be deposited to the trust account); In re Aronson, 352 N.W.2d 17 (Minn.
1984) (no analysis); see also D.C. Bar, supra note 15 (dissent) (favoring the trust account
position after analyzing the D.C. bar's decision and legislative history). While the relevant
Pennsylvania bar committee has not commented on the subject, the U.S. Tax Court has held
that under the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility, all advance fee payments had
to be deposited to a client trust account. Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284 (1979). See
generally Shank, Are Advance Fee Payments Clients' Funds?, 55 Cal. St. B.J. 370, 370-71
(1980) ("Case law, ethics opinions and public policy demonstrate that advance fee payments
should be treated as funds held for the client's benefit . . . ."); Law. Man., supra note 20, at
45:103-04 ("The majority of bar associations that have considered [whether fee advances are
the property of a client subject to trust account requirements] have found that the money
belongs to the client and may not be placed in the lawyer's personal account.").
48 See D.C. Bar, supra note 15 (analysis); Fla. Bar, Ethics Comm., Op. 76-27 (1976) (no
analysis); Disciplinary Board of the Haw. Supreme Court, Formal Op. 29 (1985) (general re
tainers and "premiums" paid to an attorney in recognition of his "experience, reputation and
ability" and so designated by written agreement are nonrefundable and therefore may be de
posited to the lawyer's general account; in the absence of such explicit agreement, the funds are
to be deposited to the trust account); 111. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 703 (1980) (no analysis); Md.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-62 (1983) (no analysis); N.Y. 570, supra note 21
(extensive analysis); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 86-128 (1986)
(no analysis); see also Dimitriou, supra note 16 (advocating the minority position); cf. C. Wolf
ram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 178 n.l5 ("Even if the lawyer is entitled to treat the fee payment as
his or her own once it is received ... if the lawyer is later required to repay the fee and fails to
do so, one decision has held that the lawyer violates DR 9-102(B)(4)." (citing Office of Disci
plinary Counsel v. Kagawa, 63 Haw. 150, 157, 622 P.2d 115, 120 (1981))).
49 See supra note 22.
5° N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. The District of Columbia Bar ("D.C.") agrees with the
New York Bar Association that advance fee payments are not "funds of clients," although for
different reasons. D.C. concludes that:
Generally, "funds of client[s]" are monies received by an attorney from a third
party for the benefit of a client or from a client for the benefit of a third party other
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its position are of three varieties: textual, legal, and policy.
A.

Textual

The Code sections Avhich are the subject of the textual scrutiny
are DR 2-110(A)(2) and (A)(3) and DR 9-102. These sections "cod
ify" the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship by stating
protections for client property in the lawyer's possession. The range
of the protections listed is extensive, and, by distinguishing among the
various forms which client property can take, the Code specializes the
protections to the type of property.
The grand design of the protections enumerated can be best
gleaned if the protections are listed in the chronological order in
which they come to apply to client property. The birth of fiduciary
concern occurs when the attorney comes into possession of client
property in any of its various forms; for example, securities or funds.
At that point, if it did not come directly from the client he is to notify
the client of its receipt.'' The attorney must also initiate careful rec
ord keeping procedures for all client property in his possession re
gardless of whether it came to him directly from the client or was paid
or delivered by a third party, and is to render an accounting to the
client whenever appropriate.'^ If the property is in the form of securi
ties or other valuable items, it is to be safeguarded by placement in a
safe deposit box (or other safe place) as quickly as possible." If the
property is in the form of "funds of clients paid to a lawyer'"'' includ
ing "[fjunds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or
potentially to the lawyer,"" it is to be safeguarded by segregating it
from the lawyer's personal funds and depositing it to a client security
than the attorney. Some portion of these funds may undoubtedly be used to satisfy
the lawyer's fee. Typically, these funds are properties of the client received from
the sale of assets or settlement of a claim or estate and held temporarily by the
attorney where the temptation for the attorney to use or confuse the client's assets
with his own must be avoided. Hence, the detailed requirements for segregating
and safeguarding these properties.
D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 4-5. Although advance fee payments are received directly from the
client rather than a third party, the temptation to commingle or misappropriate the funds is
still very strong. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Because D.C. opines that this
kind of temptation necessitates the Code's strict accounting and record keeping requirements
for monies received from third parties, these requirements should also apply to advance fee
payments. See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7 (dissent) ("If the Code prohibits commingling of
traditional trust funds in order to avoid these dangers, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Code also prohibits commingling of advances in order to avoid an identical danger.").
'1 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(1).
52 Id. DR 9-102(B)(3).
53 Id. DR 9-102(B)(2).
54 Id. DR 9-102(A).
55 Id. DR 9-102(A)(2).
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account.'®
If the lawyer seeks to withdraw from representation—whether at
his initiation or that of the client—he must first return all client prop
erty in his possession, including not only the various forms of prop
erty already mentioned but also "papers" which, though they may not
have intrinsic value, are necessary if the client is to pursue or defend
his claim with another lawyer.'^ After withdrawal, and without the
need for a client request, the lawyer is to refund promptly any
unearned advance fee payments.'® When the advance fee was initially
paid, it was in the form of "funds of clients paid to a lawyer" (and
therefore to have been deposited into a security account).'® Assuming
that as of the time of withdrawal some or ail of the work contem
plated has been completed, then the advance fee exists as "[f]unds
belonging in part to a client and in part... to the lawyer" (to which
the depository requirement extends though the lawyer can withdraw
undisputed amounts due him).®° Finally, all client property in the
lawyer's possession is to be promptly paid or delivered to the client on
request, providing that the client is entitled to the property.®'
N.Y. 570 presents four textual arguments to advance the idea
that "funds of clients" do not include advance fee payments:®^ (1) cli5® Id. DR 9-102(A). See also notes 35-46 and accompanying text (policy against
commingling).
" Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(A)(2).
'8 Id. DR 2-110(A)(3); Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.5 comment.
'9 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A). This statement is the proposition that the
Article sets out to prove. It is stated in conclusory form here because I am describing the
"grand design" of the Code's protections for client property.
60 Id. DR 9-102(A)(2).
61 Id. DR 9-102(B)(4).
62 N.Y. 570 states the textual arguments as follows:
Textually, it appears that the drafters of the Code of Professional Responsibility
did not consider advance payments of fees to be client funds necessitating their
deposit in a trust accotmt. DR 9-102(A) makes no explicit reference to advance
fee payments. The Code does make explicit reference to advance fee payments in
DR 2-110(A)(3), which requires that any unearned fee advance be promptly re
funded upon termination of the representation; it does not require that the advance
be deposited in a trust account until earned. Indeed, DR 2-110 treats fee advances
and client property as different things. It provides specifically in DR 2-110(A)(2)
for the return of all client property to the client upon withdrawal from employ
ment, and then provides separately for the refund of any unearned fee advance in
DR 2-110(A)(3).
Nor is there any suggestion in any of the Code's numerous provisions dealing
with legal fees or client funds that advance pajmients of legal fees are deemed
client funds to be deposited in a trust account.
N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4.
The sequence in which the four textual arguments appear in N.Y. 570 is 3, 1, 2, 4. The
third argument of N.Y. 570 is listed and discussed first because it benefits the flow of the
discussion.
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ent property and advance fee payments are different things, that is,
advance fee payments are not a subset of client property, and since
funds of clients are a subset of client property, then advance fee pay
ments cannot therefore be included in funds of clients;" (2) there is
no indication in the text in which funds of clients appears (DR 9102(A)) that funds of clients include advance fee payments; therefore,
funds of clients do not include advance fee payments; (3) there is no
indication in the text in which advance fee payments appears (DR 2110(A)(3)) that they are included in funds of clients; therefore, funds
of clients do not include advance fee payments; (4) in the rest of the
Code, there is no indication that funds of clients include advance fee
payments; therefore funds of clients do not include advance fee
payments.
1.

Client Property and Advance Fee Payments
Are Different Things

The textual argument advanced by N.Y. 570 to be discussed first
is that "DR 2-110 treats fee advances and client property as diflFerent
things."" DR 2-110(A)(2) provides for the return of client property
before withdrawal,®' and DR 2-110(A)(3) provides for the return of
advance fees upon withdrawal.®® Because these Code sections treat
fee advances and client property as different things, the authors of
N.Y. 570 argue that advance fees are not a part of client property.
Further, since funds of clients are included in client property, then fee
advances cannot be included in funds of clients.®'
Both the premise and the logic of this argument are wrong. By
addressing advance fee payments and other client property in different
subsections, the drafters of the Code have not evinced an intent to
declare them "different things." There are several reasons why ad
vance fee payments are singled out for specific attention—none of
which reflect an intent to classify advance fee payments to the extent
unearned as other than client property. Indeed the intent is to the
63 The argument that appears in N.Y. 570 is that client property and advance fee payments
are treated "as different things" in DR 2-110. The conclusion that therefore advance fee pay
ments cannot be included in funds of clients is not expressly stated but can be inferred. In
deed, not inferring the conclusion in the form stated could lead to a nonsequitur, i.e., since
advance fee payments are, according to N.Y. 570, different from client property, then they are
not "funds of clients."
64 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4.
65 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(A)(2).
66 Id. DR 2-110(A)(3).
67 Although N.Y. 570 does not explicitly conclude that because fee advances are not client
property, therefore they are not "funds of clients," that is the inference (indeed the only infer
ence) that logically flows from the N.Y. 570 analysis.
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contrary. DR 2-110 sets forth conditions for withdrawal from em
ployment,®® including the steps a withdrawing lawyer must take "to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his chent."®® Before the
lawyer withdraws, he must return the client's property, especially the
papers which the client will need if he is to continue representation
with another lawyer. As for advance fee payments, any unearned por
tion need not be refunded in advance since, as a practical matter, the
amount to be refunded can only be calculated after withdrawal. In
deed, the act of withdrawal, which may include petitioning a tribunal
for permission to withdraw™ or meeting with the client's replacement
lawyer to bring him up to speed, may itself result in billable hours; the
necessary accounting, therefore, can only take place subsequent to
withdrawal. Therefore, repayment of unearned advance fees could
not have been addressed in DR 2-110(A)(2) because of the temporal
diflfierences. From this perspective, DR 2-110(A)(3) is improperly
paragraphed; it should have appeared as a subset of DR 2110(A)(2)—as DR 2-110(A)(2)(a) rather than as DR 2-110(A)(3).
Advance fee payments are also singled out for attention because
of the need to articulate the substantive position that advance fee pay
ments are not the lawyer's money until earned.'* This is made a part
of the "withdrawal" provisions of the Code because it is in the context
of withdrawal that the issue of refundability is most germane. DR 2110(A)(2) commands the return of all property "to which the client is
entitled"; DR 2-110(A)(3) defines that entitlement to include advance
fee payments to the extent unearned—^again demonstrating that DR
2-110(A)(3) is a subset of DR 2-110(A)(2). The substantive statement
is a part of a broader common law rule recognized by a majority of
states that discharged attorneys—who must withdraw if they are dis
charged with or without cause'^—^may recover only the reasonable
value of the services they have rendered and are not entitled to con
tract damages.'®
68 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110.
69 Id. DR 2-110(A)(2).
70 Id. DR 2-110(A)(1).
71 Consider the situation where a client turns over money to an attorney to be used to buy
a house. Clearly, that money is the client's, see Peterson, Trust Accounts and Client Property,
49 Tex. B.J. 366, 366 (1986), and is included in DR 2-110(A)(2) as property that must be
returned prior to the attorney's withdrawal. Since both the real estate deposit and the
unearned advance fee payments are client's money, what does DR 2 110(A)(3) add to DR 2110(A)(2)? DR 2-110(AX3) clarifies that advance fee payments are not the attorney's money
until earned.
72 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(B)(4).
73 See Note, For a Few Dollars More: Client's Right to Discharge His Attorney Under a
Contingent Fee Contract, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 913, 919 n.40 (1986) (citing cases from 34 states).
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As demonstrated, expressly dealing with advance fee payments
to the extent unearned in one subsection of the Code is not a basis for
concluding that they are not a form of client property. Indeed, it is
the specialized treatment accorded the advance fee payment that spe
cifically categorizes it as a form of client property.
EverTaccepting N.Y. 570's faulty premise—since advance fee
payments and client property are different things, then advance fee
payments are not a part of client property—the conclusion derived—
since funds of clients is included in client property, then advance fee
payments cannot be included in funds of clients—is illogical. As illus
trated below, both advance fee payments and funds of clients can be
wholly included in client property even if they are regarded as mutu
ally exclusive. By the same token, however, it does not logically fol
low that because unearned advance fee payments are a form of client
property, that therefore they are "funds of clients." That is, though
funds of clients and advance fee payments are both included in client
property, it does not follow that advance fee payments are included in
funds of clients (or that funds of clients is included in advance fee
payments). That must be separately established as a matter of statu
tory construction (and will be established following the discussion of
N.Y. 570's second and third arguments).

2.

DR 9-102(A) Does Not Indicate that "Funds of Clients"
Include Advance Fee Payments

Since the strategy for any textual argument is dictated by what
the text says (and does not say), and since there is no Code text stat
ing that advance fee payments are not included in "funds of clients,"
then a less persuasive but next best alternative is to argue, as does
N.Y. 570 in the second of its four arguments, that DR 9-102(A)'s
depository requirements which are applied to "funds of clients" does
not apply to advance fee payments because if the drafters of die Code
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had so intended, they would have so stated.'" That is, since the Code
does not specifically define "funds of clients" to include advance fee
payments, then advance fee payments are not funds of clients." But
it is just as persuasive to argue, as a matter of logic, that because the
drafters of the Code did not say elsewhere that "funds of clients" do
not include funds which are in the form of advance fee payments, and
since the term "funds of clients" can easily be interpreted to include
advance fee payments (as a majority of opining bar associations have
so found'^), then if the intent was not to include advance fee pay
ments, the drafters would have so stated. Therefore, "funds of cli
ents" do include advance fee payments. Logically, then, both the
N.Y. 570 argument and its converse fail.
This is not to say, however, that textual arguments regarding
whether "funds of clients" include advance fee payments are not
available. While the omission of an inclusion does not in and of itself
yield meaning, other textual material can provide persuasive argu
ment. Note that DR 9-102(A) provides that all "funds of clients" are
to be deposited to a security account except funds which are "ad
vances for costs and expenses."" By stipulating that certain specific
"advances" need not be deposited to a security account, and by recog
nizing the existence of a "fee paid in advance" in DR 2-110(A)(3) but
not including that advance in the advances listed as exceptions in DR
9-102(A), the drafters could be indicating that advance fees had to be
deposited to a security account. For the position taken by N.Y. 570
to be persuasive, the drafters would have to have said that "funds of
clients" except "advances for costs ... expenses [and fees]" were to be
deposited to a security account. If omission of the exception for fees
in the listing of exceptions to the depositing requirement is pur
poseful, then the position taken by N.Y. 570 is against the drafter's
meaning.
3.

DR 2-110(A)(3) Does Not Indicate that Client Funds Include
Advance Fee Payments
The third textual argument is the mirror image of the second:

Cf. D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 5-6 (same argument applied to D.C. Code of Professional
Responsibility).
•'s This is a parody of the ejusdem generis rule of construction, where specific words follow
ing general words are interpreted to limit the meaning of the general words. Black's Law
Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979). In this case, the argument is that general words which are not
followed by specific words are limited by the absence of the specific words.
See supra note 47. But see N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4, which argues that "it strains
the normal meaning of words to interpret the phrase 'funds of clients' as embracing advance
legal fees paid to the lawyer."
Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A).
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namely, that advance fee payments are not included in funds of clients
because the text in which advance fee payments appear does not say
they are included in funds of clients. Thus, N.Y. 570 argues that
since DR2-110(A)(3) commands only that a lawyer promptly refund
an unearned advance fee after withdrawal, and does not state where
the lawyer must keep these funds prior to withdrawal, they need not
be kept in a security account.'® That argument is tautological, how
ever, in that its validity depends upon assuming the conclusion that it
seeks to draw; namely, that DR 9-102(A)'s "funds of clients" do not
include advance fee payments. If one concluded that "funds of cli
ents" include advance fee payments, then of course the reason why
DR 2-110(A)(3) does not expressly provide for the deposit of advance
fees into a security account is because that it is provided for in DR 9102(A).
Contrary to the position of N.Y. 570, there is considerable tex
tual evidence—supplemented by legal and policy considerations"—
that advance fee payments to the extent unearned are "funds of cli
ents," and that the "grand design" set forth at the beginning of this
section is the one most consistent with the interaction of the various
provisions of DR 2-110 and DR 9-102.
Both DR 9-102(B)(3) and DR 9-102(A) deal with client funds; in
the former, the phraseology is "funds ... of a cUent," and in the
latter, "funds of clients." The terms must be taken as identical in
meaning. Therefore, if advance fee payments are not "funds of cli
ents" for purposes of DR 9-102(A), then they are not "funds ... of a
client" for purposes of DR 9-102(B)(3), which provides that a lawyer
shall maintain "complete records" and "render appropriate accounts"
of client funds in "the possession of the lawyer."®" If N.Y. 570's con
clusions were controlling, then a lawyer receiving an advance fee pay
ment who is discharged prior to completion of the work for which he
was hired, and who therefore is obligated to return the unearned por
tion of the advance fee, would not be obligated to have kept records of
the funds or to render an accounting to the client.®^
DR 9-102(B)(4) provides for the prompt return to the client, on
his request, of all "funds, securities, or other properties in the posses
sion of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive,"®' Again, the
•'s N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4.
See infra notes 101-27 and accompanying text.
80 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(3).
81 Cf. Va. State Bar, supra note 47 Oawyer who receives an advance fee and whose client
discharges him before the services are fully performed must account to the client, upon re
quest, for all or any part of the fee paid and services performed).
82 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(4).
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"funds" of DR 9-102(B)(4) are the "funds" of DR 9-102(A). Assume
that very shortly after payment of a fee advanced for the performance
of a specific service, a client has a change of heart and decides not to
proceed with that legal matter. The lawyer, to that point, has ex
pended no time. Under the leading case of Martin v. Camp,^^ the
lawyer is obligated to return the entire advance fee. Since the lawyer
has not withdrawn (because the client is still contemplating going for
ward), he is not obligated by DR 2-110(A)(3) to return the advance
fee. Nor would DR 9-102 provide the basis for the lawyer's obligation
to refund the funds, as requested, if, as N.Y. 570 stated, "funds of
clients" did not include advance fee payments. Indeed, once DR 9102 is read as N.Y. 570 reads it, there is no basis in the Code (or
Model Rules) to conclude that the lawyer is obligated to promptly
return the fee upon request. The N.Y. 570 interpretation of DR 9102(B)(4) is therefore inconsistent with the all-inclusive compass of
that section regarding the prompt payment of all client funds in the
lawyer's possession which the client is entitled to receive.
DR 9-102(A)(2) states that "[f]unds belonging in part to a client
and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer . . . must be depos
ited" to a trust account.®"* Two situations are envisioned by that re
quirement: (1) where payment is received in a contingent fee case
from which a percentage is to be paid to the lawyer; and (2) the ad
vance fee payment. When the fee payment is advanced to the lawyer,
he has not yet earned that money; the money is only potentially his.®'
DR 9-102(A)(2) further provides that the portion of the jointly owned
funds belonging to the lawyer may be withdrawn "when due" (unless
the client disputes the payment),®® again specifically contemplating
the advance fee payment situation (as well as the contingent fee). As
the lawyer performs the requested service, he can withdraw that part
of the advance fee that he has earned from the trust fund.®^ N.Y. 570
advances no credible argument why such jointly owned funds should
not be interpreted according to their plain meaning®® to include ad83 219 N.Y. 170, 176, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916).
84 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2).
85 "By speaking of funds which 'potentially' belong to the lawyer, this provision appears to
anticipate the [advance fee situation]
At the time the advance is tendered by the client, the
lawyer has not yet earned it, and the money is only potentially his...." D.C. Bar, supra note
15, at 6 (dissent). See Shank, supra note 47, at 371; see also State Bar of Tex., supra note 9, at
12 (if "no guarantee that the attorney will be entitled to the full amount," the funds must be
deposited into a trust account).
86 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2).
87 See Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284, 286 (1979) (earned fees withdrawn quarterly
for convenience).
88 Those inclined to pick at nits could take issue with the "plain meaning" argument. An
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vance fee payments.®'
N.Y. 570's argument that "funds of clients" do not include ad
vance fee payments because the Code does not specifically provide
either in DR 2-110(A)(3) or DR 9-102(A) that they do has already
been dealt with as a matter of logic.®® From the perspective of mesh
ing the two Code sections in the manner most consistent with the
stated purposes and objectives, we can see obvious reasons why DR 2110(A)(3) does not expressly state that advance fee payments are to be
deposited to a trust account. The Code's drafters did not spell out the
entire panoply of protections accorded client property in DR 2-110
because property was being considered only in the context of with
drawal from representation. Providing in DR 2-110 that advance fee
payments were to be deposited to a security account not only would
be irrelevant to DR 2-110's purpose, but would also be redundant
since DR 9-102, as per its title, "Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client," provides protections regardless of whether the
lawyer's representation is ongoing or terminating. DR 2-110(A) also
does not require the withdrawing lawyer to provide the client with an
accounting of his property or advance fee payment though that is ger
mane to withdrawal, since that is provided for in all circumstances in
DR 9-102(B)(3). Similarly, it does not provide for deposit of property
(to the extent that funds are involved) or advance fee payments into a
security account because that is provided for in all circumstances in
DR 9-102(A).
The schematic design of DR 9-102 further supports the thesis of
this paper. Client property must be safeguarded—that is the fiduciary
ukase. But how? "Funds of chents" are to be deposited into a secur
ity account to protect them from the lawyer's creditors," from the
advance fee paid to a lawyer, which both he and the client anticipate the lawyer will earn in
toto, could be said to be not "[f]unds belonging in part of a client and in part presently or
potentiaUy to the lawyer," Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2), but rather, fluids
potentially belonging in whole to the lawyer. The same situation occurs when a lawyer on a
one-third contingent fee receives a settlement check in a personal injury case made out jointly
to his client and himself, which he deposits to the trust account, and then pays out two-thirds
to the client but does not withdraw his one-third because the client disputes the contingent fee;
the funds remaining are potentially entirely the lawyer's. To state precisely what the drafters
meant, DR 9-102(AX2) should be read as if it said "[f]unds belonging in part [or in whole,
presently or potentially] to a client and in part [or in whole] presently or potentially to the
lawyer . . . must be deposited" to the security account. The solution to this nit does not
diminish the textual argument regarding DR 9-102(AX2).
8' It is secondarily applicable to the contingent fee case where the client objects to the fee
percentage. That objection suspends the lawyer's right to withdraw the part that represents his
fee until the dispute is resolved. Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(AX2).
^ See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 35.
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lawyer,'^ and from the lawyer's self-help remedy if those funds in
clude or constitute the lawyer's fee. DR 9-102(A)'s depository re
quirements do not deal with the broader category of client property,
because items which are client property but not "funds of chents,"
such as client papers, deeds, and securities, are physically incapable of
being deposited into a security account. They can and must be safe
guarded by deposit into a safe deposit box,'^ which is the closest
equivalent of deposit to a security account. As already noted, the no
tification, record keeping, accounting, and payment requirements ap
ply to all client property in the lawyer's possession. "Funds of
chents" and other client property require different treatment with re
gard to their safeguarding—the former in security accounts, and the
latter in a safe deposit box—^but are treated alike, since funds are a
subset of property, regarding notification, record keeping, accounting,
and repayment. Accordingly, the "failure" to include in DR 9102(A) that "funds of clients" include advance fee payments or to
include in DR 2-110(A)(3) that advance fee payments are "funds of
clients" are not failures at all, but simply reflect a drafting design
which both from the point of view of specific Code provisions and the
broader fiduciary purposes of the Code, is most consistent with the
position that "funds of clients" include advance fee payments.
4.

Code Gives No Indication that Client Funds Include Advance
Fee Payments

The fourth textual argument raised by N.Y. 570 is that there is
no "suggestion in any of the Code's numerous provisions dealing with
legal fees or client funds that advance fee payments are to be depos
ited in a trust account.'"'* However, eight of the nine Disciplinary
Rules and thirteen of the fourteen Ethical Considerations cited'' are
totally irrelevant'® to the question of whether advance fee payments
are "funds of clients." For example, DR 2-106 sets forth the criteria
for determining whether a fee is excessive," DR 2-107 deals with for92 See supra text accompanying note 38.
93 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(2).
94 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4.
95 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-103(C)-(D), 2-106, 2-107, 2-110(A)(3), 3-102, 4101(C)(4), 5-103(A), 5-106(A); EC 2-8, 2-15 to -25, 2-32, 9-5.
96 DR 2-110(A)(3) which is cited is relevant and has been dealt with extensively in this
section. EC 9-5 is also cited and is also relevant, but simply states that "[s]eparation of the
funds of a client from those of his lawyer not only serves to protect the client but also avoids
even the appearance of impropriety, and therefore commingling of funds should be avoided."
Model Code, supra note 4, EC 9-5.
97 Id. DR 2-106.
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warding fees,'® DR 3-102 with dividing fees with a non-lawyer," and
DR 4-101(C)(4) with a lawyer's revealing confidences or secrets to
collect his fee.*°° Neither these nor the other sections cited have any
bearing on the issue in question.
B.

The Legal Argument of Ownership

N.Y. 570 argues that, as a matter of law, advance fee payments
become the property of the lawyer upon receipt, and therefore "it
strains the normal meaning of words to interpret the phrase 'funds of.
clients' as embracing advance legal fees paid to the lawyer."'®' The
argument based on legal ownership proceeds:
Normally, when one pays in advance for services to be rendered or
property to be delivered, ownership of the funds passes upon pay
ment, absent an express agreement that the payment be held in
trust or escrow, and notwithstanding the payee's obligation to per
form or to refund the payment.'®^
The operative word in the quoted sentence is "normally." The law
yer-client relationship is not a normal, arm's length business transac
tion—it is a fiduciary relationship based on trust and loyalty.'®^ A
lawyer who is legally entitled to his contractually provided fee under
commercial law standards may not be entitled to the fee as a matter of
fiduciary law.'®^ Whereas a homeowner who dismisses a painter with
out just cause in the middle of a job is liable for breach of contract
damages, a client who discharges his lawyer arbitrarily is not liable
for contract damages,'®' but only for the value of the services actually
98 Id. DR 2-107.
99 Id. DR 3-102.
100 Id. DR 4-101(C)(4).
101 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4.
102 Id. at 4-5. See also D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 3 ("Prepayments are commonly made for
many other types of goods and services.").
103
lawyer's duty is a high one which, because of the nature of the relationship
that exists between an attorney and his client, embraces moral standards that are
more stringent than those applicable to others. This duty, which is first assumed
with the taking of the oath on admission to the bar, is not shed as long as one
remains a member of the profession.
Comment, supra note 40, at 1598 n.6 (quoting Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 518, 307
A.2d 677, 682 (1973)). See also Meintod v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(1928) ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not hon
esty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.").
lO'i In suing his client for collection of his fee, an attorney "urges the application of ordinary
commercial laws. In light of the fiduciary obligation involved, the Court finds those rules
inapplicable." Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (La. Ct. App. 1980). See Spilker v.
Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951); In re Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266, 273, 686 P.2d 1236,
1243 (1984); C. Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 147.
A lawyer "cannot rely on the commercial laws to collect a fee that he has not entirely
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rendered.'"^ To seek to equate the lawyer-client relationship to the
normal business relationship is to ignore the thrust of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that it is the "obligation of
lawyers ... to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.'""^
Further, it ignores the specific safeguards set forth in the Code to pre
serve and protect client funds, by maintenance of records, safekeep
ing, prompt refund, and deposit into a security account.'"®
The attorney also does not possess sole ownership of the advance
fee payment upon receipt because the attorney must return any
unearned fees;'"® the client thus retains a continuing interest in these
funds. Since fees are not earned until services are rendered,"" attor
neys hold the advance fee payments in trust for the client until the
services are performed and the fees are thereby earned.'" These
funds are therefore "funds of clients" within the meaning of DR 9102(A), and under its terms must be deposited into a cUent trust
account."^
C.

Policy Considerations

Policy considerations strongly support the position that the de
pository requirements for "funds of clients" apply to advance fee pay
ments. Three distinct policy goals may be identified: (1) to preserve
the client's property from the reach of the lawyer's creditors;"® (2) to
preserve the client's property from possible misappropriation by the
lawyer;"'' and (3) to enable the client to realistically dispute a fee
where the funds are already in the lawyer's possession by disallowing
a self-help resolution by the lawyer and instead preserving the dis
puted funds intact until the dispute is resolved.'"
The first pohcy goal is best effectuated by depositing the advance
fee payment into a trust account. If a part of the advance fee has to be
earned, due to his discharge by his client.... The contract provision concerning compensation
is therefore unenforceable." Simon, 383 So. 2d at 1324.
Martin v. Camp. 219 N.Y. 170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). See supra note 73.
'07 Model Code, supra note 4, Preamble.
'08 Id. DR 2-110(AX3)-(A)(4); DR 9-102.
'09 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(A)(3). See State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 568, 639
P.2d 1131, 1136 (1982); In re Martinez, 431 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 1982); State Bar of Tex.,
supra note 9.
"o Martin, 219 N.Y. at 176, 114 N.E. at 48; N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 1 n.l.
"1 See Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d 153, 164 n.4, 593 P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979).
"2 See Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A).
"3 See supra note 35.
' '•• See supra text accompanying note 38.
"3 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(AX2).
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returned to the client, either because of termination"® or completion
of services,"' it may no longer be available for return if deposited to
the attorney's personal account and attached by the attorney's credi
tors. If deposited to a security account, the funds are insulated from
the reach of creditors."®
The prophylactic policy goal of reducing the likelihood that cli
ent funds will be misappropriated by the lawyer if commingled rather
than deposited to a security account has been previously addressed."'
The importance of this policy consideration is accentuated by empiri
cal data on the causes of lawyer defalcation. In New York, the failure
to return unearned fee advances constitutes a major disciplinary prob
lem."® The Clients' Security Fund of New York (the "Fund"), which
has been set up to compensate clients who have been defrauded by
their lawyers, pays out a substantial percentage of its claims to com
pensate "clients who paid legal fees in advance to attorneys who later
abandoned them without completing the services they agreed to pro
vide.""' Since the Fund's shortage of resources permits it to reim
burse clients for only a small percentage of each legitimate claim filed,
a requirement that advance fees be deposited to a security account"^
would not only reduce the misappropriation of client funds but would
also increase the percentage of each supportable claim that could be
repaid. The position advocated by N.Y. 570 would tend to increase
misappropriation of client funds, decreasing the amount of each claim
that a defrauded client could receive from the Fund."®
The third policy goal is to protect a client's right to dispute a .
fee—where the funds are in the attorney's possession—^by prohibiting
116
117
118
119

Id. DR 2-110(A)(3); Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.5 comment.
Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(4).
See supra text accompanying notes 23-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
120 "[c]laims seeking reimbursement for unearned legal fees comprise a substantial portion
of [the Clients' Security Fund's] business, despite the fact that the actual monetary losses in
volved are relatively small compared to other losses." Letter to Professor Lester Brickman
from Frederick Miller, Executive Director and Counsel of The Clients' Security Fund of New
York (Apr. 23, 1986). Since 1982, more than 51% of all claims filed with the Fund involved
attorneys who kept unearned legal fees. The Clients' Security Fund of the State of New York,
1987 Annual Report 13 (1988). In 1986, unearned legal fees were the leading cause of claims,
comprising 127 of the 341 claims received that year. The Clients' Security Fund of the State of
New York, 1986 Annual Report 12 (1987).
171 Letter to Professor Brickman, supra note 120.
172 Periodic audits would increase the efiicacy of the requirement. See supra note 46.
173 A nonscientific survey by the author indicated that most attorneys deposit advance fee
payments to their personal accounts. Indeed, attorneys were surprised to leam that there was
even an issue regarding the propriety of that deposit. This may account for why such a high
percentage of claims paid by the Fund is for advance fees paid to lawyers who do not complete
the work for which they were retained.
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the attorney from withdrawing the funds representing his fee from the
security account until the dispute is resolved.'^'* N.Y. 570 speaks di
rectly to this goal:
[T]he very reason that many lawyers require advance fee payments
in the first place is so that they will not be subject to a client's
refusal to pay for legal services after they are rendered. If fee ad
vances were required to be deposited in a client trust account, it
would follow that this purpose of requiring advance payment could
be easily defeated by a chent who, after services are rendered, dis
putes a justly earned fee. Under DR 9-102(A)(2), the disputed
portion of the fee would have to be retained in the client trust ac
count, and would not be available to the lawyer, until the dispute
was resolved.'^'
Precisely. The trust requirement imposed by DR 9-102(A) frus
trates an underlying purpose of the advance fee: to weight the finan
cial relationship between lawyer and client in favor of the lawyer.'^®
DR 9-102(A), in effectuating the fiduciary nature of the relationship,
places the interests of the client paramount. The burden is on the
attorney to resolve a fee dispute since he cannot withdraw the funds
until the dispute is resolved. The implicit message of N.Y. 570 is that
to avoid this protection afforded the client, lawyers should obtain ad
vance fee payments and deposit them to their general accounts. Thus,
the burden in any fee dispute would be shifted to the client. The pol
icy of N.Y. 570 is the diametric of the fiduciary policy articulated in
DR 9-102 (and repeated with even greater emphasis in the Model
Rules).'"
Similar to N.Y. 570's policy position is the District of Columbia
Bar's argument that the additional accounting burdens and costs in
curred by attorneys if advance payments must be deposited to client
trust accounts favor the placement of these fees in the attorney's office
account.'^® DR 9-102(B)(3) requires detailed record keeping for all
"funds, securities, or other properties" of the client received by the
attorney.'^' Further, the District of Columbia bar argues that interest
>24 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2).
>25 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 5 (footnote omitted). Of. D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 2-3
("Typically, lawyers seek fee advances when dealing with clients where no established relation
ship exists, where a client's past behavior raises concern about promptness of future payment
or where substantial legal work will occur at the outset.").
>26 D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 6-7 (The objective of the fee advance is to "take the attorney
away from the financial mercies of the client.").
>27 "[A.] lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's [fee] con
tention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust. . .." Model Rules, supra
note 4, Rule 1.15 comment.
>28 See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7-8.
>29 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(3). The Fund recommended that the courts
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earned on these trust accounts also creates "burdensome accounting
problems" which the minority contend will cause exasperated at
torneys and clients "to place the funds in non-interest bearing ac
counts, benefitting only the bank."^^* However, the practice of
depositing
advanced fees into the 9-102 trust account and . . . self-restraint as
to the use of fees until they are earned would not impose significant
burdens upon attorneys in light of DR 9-102(A)(2) which provides
that those portions of funds so deposited may be withdrawn by the
attorney when due unless the right to receive those funds is dis
puted by the client. The only real burden imposed upon the attor
ney in such a case involves some additional bookkeeping. . . .
[A]dditional bookkeeping is a necessary burden of the profession.
In light of the harm to the profession and the public caused by the
loss of clients' funds and by the mere appearance of impropriety, it
is a relatively small burden for the profession to bear.^^^
In addition to bookkeeping burdens, the minority position argues that
the existence of clients' security funds"^ supports their view—an ar
gument akin to condoning bank robbery because banks are insured.
D.

Tax Consequences

Although N.Y. 570's authors declined to consider the tax conse
quences of their decision,'^' the different tax treatments under the maadopt statewide banking and record keeping rules for members of the New York bar. See 1986
Annual Report, supra note 120, at 21.
130 D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7.
131 Id. at 8. In today's world of computerized bookkeeping, allocating interest among the
various client moneys in a security account presents little difficulty. Moreover, the issue will
only be significant if large sums are involved. In that circumstance, there should be a clear
understanding with the client as to who is entitled to the interest generated.
132 State Bar of Tex., supra note 9, at 10. See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 8-9 (dissent);
Miller, Lawyer: Fiduciary, Accountant, Archivist, 58 N.Y. St. B.J. 15, 17 (1986).
133 Clients' security funds have been established in many jurisdictions to compensate ag
grieved clients for the dishonest actions of their lawyers. The funds were created "to promote
public confidence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal profession by
reimbursing losses caused by the dishonest conduct of attorneys . . . ." 1986 Annual Report,
supra note 120, at 4. See generally Comment, supra note 39, at 424-32 (goals of fund).
134 See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7. Since these funds will partially compensate the vic
timized client, the minority is satisfied that these funds will make amends for a dishonest
lawyer's behavior or the inconvenience to the client of having to pursue fee reimbursement in
court. Since 1982, however. New York's Clients' Security Fund has only reimbursed 986
claimants out of 1500 processed claims. The disbursements totalled $3,957,544, but the losses
exceeded $7,000,000. 1986 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 1. Further, because attorneys
are fiduciaries, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, clients should not have to pursue their
attorneys in court for the return of unearned fees. Thus, the minority's reliance on clients'
security funds is misplaced.
135 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 7 n.6.
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jority and minority positions justify such consideration. If deposited
to a trust account, advance fee payments are not income for federal
tax purposes until undisputedly earned; but if deposited to an attor
ney's account, the advances are income immediately.'^® The Tax
Court reached this conclusion in Miele v. Commissioner,^^'' determin
ing that "whether the law firm was in receipt of income when the
prepaid legal fees were received by it. . . . depend[ed] upon whether
the firm received the fees under a claim of right and without restric
tion as to their disposition.""® By analyzing the requirements of the
Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility section governing
client funds and property,"' the court concluded that under Penn
sylvania law governing attorneys, "prepaid legal fees received by the
firm are to be treated as owned by the client until an undisputed
amount is due the firm.'"^ The court next reasoned that "the prohi
bition against commingling these funds with the law firm's and re
strictions upon use until an undisputed amount is due clearly indicate
the firm did not receive these funds under a claim of right and without
substantial restriction as to disposition.'"'*' Consequently, advance
payments of legal fees are not income when actually received, but
when undisputedly earned.'*^
Thus, by stating that prepaid legal fees are not client funds that
require placement in a trust account unless there is an agreement by
the lawyer and client to the contrary,'*® the New York State Bar As
sociation Committee on Professional Ethics has eflfectively required
that New York attorneys treat advance fee payments as income upon
receipt. Therefore, if the client exercises his right to terminate the
relationship before the fee is earned, and that occurs in the tax year
following receipt, tax liabilities would be generated that could not be
136 Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284 (1979). In Miele, a Pennsylvania law firm (tax
payer) followed the majority position and deposited all advance payments for legal fees in
client trust accounts. Id. at 285.
137 Id. at 284.
138 Id. at 289 (citing North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932)).
139 Id. at 289-90. That section, Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility Discipli
nary Rule 9-102, is textually identical to Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102.
140 Miele, 72 T.C. at 290.
Ill Id.
142 The Miele court also held that advance fee payments are "constructively received" when
earned even if the funds are not removed from the trust account. Id. at 290-91.
1^3 N.Y. 570 opines that advance fee payments are the attorney's property when received,
but it permits the attorney and client to contract that the prepayment is the client's property.
N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 6-7. If the attorney and client do agree that the advance fee is the
client's property and therefore, under DR 9-102, must be deposited to a client trust account,
the advance fee would not be treated as income until undisputedly earned by the attorney.
This agreement is effective for tax purposes even though the attorney's sole motivation for
entering it is for tax deferral purposes. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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oflFset until the next year. The majority position, of course, avoids this
inconvenience for the lawyer.
E.

N.Y. 570 and Fiduciary Law

Whether an advance fee payment is to be deposited to a security
account or to a personal account has been determined by all of the
commenting bar associations, except N.Y. 570, to be a binary deci
sion. It must go into one or the other. If the advance fee is not
"funds of clients" but rather the attorney's money, then a supercautious lawyer seeking to be scrupulous would be guilty of commingling
if he deposited the advance fee to his trust account. To avoid this
either/or situation and presumably to give the lawyer control over his
income flow for federal tax purposes, N.Y. 570 essentially gives the
lawyer the option. The advance fee is not "funds of clients" unless
the lawyer entered into an agreement with the client "to treat the
advance payments or legal fees as client funds and deposit them in a
client trust account."^'^ The client willing to pay an advance fee to
retain the lawyer—without designating the sum as "funds of clients"
for purposes of DR 9-102(A)—will of course be willing to agree, at
the lawyer's request, that they be denominated as "funds of clients" if
that suits the lawyer.
This "best of both worlds" approach to advance fees omits an
important element. Since the lawyer is a fiduciary for the client,'^'
and since the client typically does not comprehend the significance of
the "funds of clients" designation, which is for the benefit of the law
yer at the client's expense, it is the fiduciary duty of the lawyer, in
presenting the retainer agreement, to explain to the client the signifi
cance of the distinction."^^ Specifically, the client would have to be
told that if he agreed to designate the funds as the lawyer's own, then
he would be forfeiting the protection afforded him by DR 9-102(A)(2)
144 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 2.
145 See Rosner v. Paley, 65 N.Y.2d 736, 492 N.Y.S.2d 13, 481 N.E.2d 553 (1985); C. Wolf
ram, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 146-47.
146 Model Code, supra note 4, EC 5-7, 7-8, 2-20; Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145,
146-49 (Fla. 1975); Robinson v. Sharp, 201 111. 86, 66 N.E. 299 (1903); Moran v. Simpson, 42
N.D. 575, 173 N.W. 769 (1919); 2 E. Thornton, A Treatise on Attorneys at Law § 429, at 743
(1914) ("Attorneys, in entering into contracts of employment with clients, are required to
exercise the highest order of good faith . . . disclosing all information ... as to facts which
would or might influence him either in entering into, or refusing to execute, the contract.");
N.Y. State Bar, Op. 569 (1985); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 371 (1945); cf. Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 481, 481, 196 N.W.2d 619, 622
(1972) (per curiam) (where bank knows customer is placing trust and confidence in it, bank
has special duty to counsel and inform customer of all material facts, including bank's
motives).
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with regard to disputing the fee.'"*' Further, fiduciary law would re
quire that the now fully informed chent be given the option of
designating the funds as "funds of chents" or the lawyer's own."*® A
client who "willingly" exercises his option to designate the funds as
the lawyer's own is almost certainly uninformed.*'*'
Therefore, even if the New York State Bar Association Commit
tee on Professional Ethics elects to retain N.Y. 570, it is bound to
rectify its incomplete opinion by addition of the fiduciary require
ments enumeratwi above.

IV. THE MODEL RULES COMPARED
In 1983, the American Bar Association replaced the Code with
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules").Although
New York has rejected the Rules,*'* an examination of the Rules with
regard to advance fee payments is relevant and confirms the conclu
sion that both under the Model Rules and Model Code, advance fee
payments are to be deposited to a trust account. In form, the Rules
follow a "Restatement of the Law" format. Research notes follow
each new rule, comparing that rule with its counterpart in the Code.
147 See Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 993, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d
381, 382 (1985).
148 Arguably, failure to do so would violate DR 1-102(A)(2) which prohibits a lawyer from
"circumventpng] a Disciplinary Rule through action of another." Model Code, supra note 4,
DR 9-102(A)(2). In this case, the lawyer would be using the uninformed client to enable the
lawyer to circumvent the requirements of DR 9-102(A)(2).
149 Sec Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986). A
client who agrees to pay a contingent fee exceeding the risk of no recovery—though he can
afford to pay an hourly fee, has been informed of the hourly fee choice, and presented with the
risk—has probably not understood the discussion of risk and has not given his "fully informed
consent." In a "contingent-fee contract [t]he client needs to be fully informed as to the degree
of risk justifying a contingent fee." Id. at 113. See Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 148
(Fla. 1975): In re Kutner, 78 111. 2d 157, 35 111. Dec. 157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1979); Wunschel
Law Firm v. Clabough, 291 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Iowa 1980); Cooper & Keys v. Bell, 127 Tenn.
142, 153 S.W. 844 (1912); Cal. Rule 2-107(B)(9) ("[t]he informed consent of the client to the
fee agreement"); cf. Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1988, at 30, col. 3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 1988). In Schenck, a lawyer hired to sue another lawyer for malprac
tice was Wmself a potential defendant in the same action, and obtained client consent to waive
the conflict of interest. In disqualifying the lawyer, the court said: "the consent obtained in
this case does not reflect a full understanding of the legal rights being waived. . . . [T]he
unsophisticated client, relying upon the confidential relationship with his lawyer, may not be
regarded as able to understand the ramifications of the conflict, however much explained to
him." Id.
150 Model Rules, supra note 4.
isi The New York State Bar Association has rejected proposing that the appellate divisions
adopt the Model Rules. See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, Current Reports (ABA/BNA) 77
(Mar. 16, 1988). Further, the presiding justices of the appellate division have indicated that
they will not act contrary to the position taken by the Bar Association. Wise, State Bar Dele
gates Refuse to Adopt New Conduct Rules, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1985, col. 3, at 1.
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Where a rule deviates from the Code the "Model Code Comparison"
states the deviation; where no change is noted, the Rules, though us
ing different language, are not deviating from the Code's position on
that subject.
Rule 1.15(a), the Rules' counterpart to DR 9-102(A), states in
pertinent part:
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is
in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation sepa
rate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a sep
arate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is
situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third per
son. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded. . .
In commenting on the legal background of Rule 1.15, the draft
ers stated that "[f]unds are often given to a lawyer for payment of
costs or as an advance from which fees may be drawn when
earned.'"®^ This strongly infers that the drafters intended that ad
vance fees are "property of chents ... in a lawyer's possession" and
are to be held "separate from the lawyer's own property, and if this
property consists of funds, then these "[f]unds shall be kept in a sepa
rate account. . .
Since these advance fees are to be "drawn when
earned," they cannot be deposited to the lawyer's general office or
personal account because they would immediately lose this separate
identity. The only way in which advance fees may be "drawn when
earned" is if they are deposited into a security account. Since the
Model Rules, in the "Code Comparison" to Rule 1.15,''' do not indi
cate that it is changing the Code by providing that advance fee pay
ments are to be deposited to a security account, it is confirming that
the drafters of the Model Rules regarded the Model Code as provid
ing that the depository requirements for "funds of clients" also apply
to advance fee payments—^that is, that "funds of clients" include ad
vance fee payments."®
'52 Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA) Rule 1.15(a), at 164 (1984).
153 Id. at 168.
154 Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.15(a).
155 The Model Code Comparison states that Rule 1.15(a) modifies DR 9-102(A) by requir
ing funds of third parties to be separately maintained in addition to clients' funds. The Com
parison states no other policy changes.
156 In one of the Rules' earlier proposed drafts, the Legal Background section stated that
Rule 1.15(a) does not apply to unearned advance fees. ABA Proposed Final Draft, Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ICQ (May 30, 1981). This statement was removed from the
proposed final draft of the Rules. One reason for the comment's removal was probably be
cause the only authority cited as support for the comment failed to support it. The source, a
student Comment, stated that "DR 9-102(A) ... is ambiguotts as to whether fees paid in
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CONCLUSION
Whether viewed from a textual, legal, or policy perspective, the
position of N.Y. 570 and the other adherents of the minority position
is indefensible. It is inconsistent with the text of the Code of Profes
sional Responsibility and of the Rules of Professional Conduct; it
seeks to replace fiduciary law with commercial law to govern the at
torney-client relationship; and it accentuates the likelihood of loss of
chent funds at a time when the losses sustained by advance fee paying
chents aggregate as much or more than all other categories of client
loss. In seeking to elevate the interests of the attorney above those of
the cUent, it runs counter to the very purposes of the Code of Profes
sional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Even
the features of the minority position that may be attractive to some
lawyers because they ostensibly "protect" the lawyer by offering him
a way around the Code- and Rule-mandated protections for the cli
ent, are little more than a snare and a delusion. The minority position
raises attorneys' chances of being disciplined for failing to promptly
return any unearned fee payments in violation of DR 2-110(A)(3), it
increases the likelihood of commingling funds and of misappropria
tion or unintentional embezzlement by attorneys, and it enlarges at
torneys' exposure to hability due to loss of the funds. Additionally,
attorneys in states adopting the minority view may be subjected to less
favorable tax treatment. Accordingly, the New York Committee on
Professional Ethics and other adherents of the minority view should
reconsider their determination that advance fee payments are not
"fimds of clients" within the ambit of DR 9-102, and should declare
that advance fee payments must be deposited to client security ac
counts and withdrawn only when indisputably earned.
advance for specific services yet to be performed continue to belong to the client until the
attorney performs the services." Comment, supra note 39, at 437 (footnotes omitted; emphasis
added). The note cited Carpenter, supra note 39, at 340 ("It has been suggested that [advance
fees] should always be held in a segregated trust account, but DR 9-102 does not make this
clear."). Since this Legal Background Section comment was omitted from the final proposed
draft of the Rules, it may reasonably be concluded that the drafters rejected the view that the
Model Code did not include advance fee payments within the ambit of "funds of clients," as
well as the view that the Model Rules should fail to follow the Model Code's position on
advance fees.

